

 June 29, 2018 White Paper

The Printer	Worki	ng Group
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4	IPP Authentication Methods
5	(IPPAUTH)
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8	Status: Interim
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10 11 12	Abstract: This document is a whitepaper that describes the interaction between IPP and various authentication mechanisms used over IPP's HTTP, HTTPS and TLS transports, and how their nuances can affect the authentication user experience on IPP Client systems.
13	This document is a White Paper. For the definition of a "White Paper", see:
14	http://ftp.pwg.org/pub/pwg/general/pwg-process30.pdf
15	This document is available electronically at:
16	http://ftp.pwg.org/pub/pwg/ipp/whitepaper/tb-ippauth-20180629.odt

17 http://ftp.pwg.org/pub/pwg/ipp/whitepaper/tb-ippauth-20180629.pdf

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- 19 Title: IPP Authentication Methods (IPPAUTH)

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65	9.4. January 23, 2018	
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74 **1. Introduction**

75 The Internet Printing Protocol (hereafter, IPP) uses HTTP as its underlying transport 76 [RFC8010]. When an IPP Printer is configured to limit access to its services to only those 77 Clients operated by an authorized User, it challenges the User's Client by employing one of the HTTP authentication methods. But an IPP Client isn't usually a typical HTTP User 78 Agent (e.g. it isn't a commonly used Web browser). This white paper examines the 79 common HTTP authentication methods employed today and outlines limits, constraints 80 and conventions that ought to be considered when implementing support for one of these 81 82 different HTTP authentication methods to ensure a high quality printing user experience.

83 **2. Terminology**

84 **2.1. Protocol Roles Terminology**

85 This document defines the following protocol roles in order to specify unambiguous 86 conformance requirements:

87 *Client*: Initiator of outgoing IPP session requests and sender of outgoing IPP operation 88 requests (Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230] User Agent).

Printer: Listener for incoming IPP session requests and receiver of incoming IPP operation
 requests (Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230] Server) that represents one
 or more Physical Devices or a Logical Device.

92 **2.2. Other Terms Used in This Document**

93 *User*: A person or automata using a Client to communicate with a Printer.

94 **2.3. Acronyms and Organizations**

- 95 IANA: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, http://www.iana.org/
- 96 *IETF*: Internet Engineering Task Force, <u>http://www.ietf.org/</u>
- 97 /SO: International Organization for Standardization, http://www.iso.org/
- 98 *PWG*: Printer Working Group, <u>http://www.pwg.org/</u>

3. Overview of IPP Authentication Methods

This white paper describes how various HTTP based authentication systems integrate into IPP communications between a Client and a Printer. Although the authentication protocols themselves do not need to change to be integrated into IPP communications, the IPP Client is not a Web browser, so IPP Client and Printer implementors ought to consider factors that can improve or degrade the user experience.

105 **3.1. Client Authentication Methods**

106 A Printer uses the "authenticated identity" or the "most authenticated user" [RFC8011] to 107 determine whether to allow the requesting Client access to capabilities such as operations, resources, and attributes. Authentication is the process of establishing some level of trust 108 109 that an entity is who or what they are claiming to be. An IPP Printer specifies its supported 110 authentication methods via several IPP attributes. The "uri-authentication-supported" 111 attribute [RFC8011] indicates the authentication method used for a corresponding URI in 112 "printer-uri-supported" [RFC8011]. The "xri-authentication" member attribute of "printer-xri-113 supported" [RFC3380] specifies the same corresponding values, if the Printer implements 114 the "printer-xri-supported" attribute.


In some cases, the Printer is not directly involved in the authentication process, and may not be directly aware of the User's identity following authentication. In these cases, the Printer might still need to acquire the User's identity in order to accurately document the User's identity in the Job Object's Job Status attributes, or to support IPP operations such as Get-User-Printer-Attributes [IPPGUPA] that depend on the User's identity to provide meaningfully filtered operation responses.

Each of the authentication method keywords currently registered for "uri-authenticationsupported" is described below, with an accompanying sequence diagram for illustration purposes, as well as a discussion of each method's advantages and shortcomings.

124 **3.1.1. The 'none' IPP Authentication Method**

The 'none' IPP Authentication Method [RFC8011] very simply indicates that the receiving Printer is provided no method whatsoever to determine the identity of the User who is operating the Client that is making IPP operation requests. The user name for the operation is assumed to be 'anonymous'. This method is not recommended unless the Printer's operator has the objective of providing an anonymous print service. In most cases, the Client SHOULD provide the "requesting-user-name" operation attribute, as described in section 3.1.2.


Figure 3.1 illustrates how the 'none' authentication method integrates into an IPP operation
 request / response exchange. Other authentication methods will expand on this baseline
 request / response exchange.



138 **3.1.2.** The 'requesting-user-name' IPP Authentication Method

139 In the 'requesting-user-name' IPP Authentication Method [RFC8011], the Client MUST 140 provides the "requesting-user-name" operation attribute [RFC8011] in its IPP operation 141 request. The Printer uses this unauthenticated name as the identity of the actor operating 142 the Client. This method is not recommended since there is no actual authentication 143 performed as there is no credential provided to prove the identity claimed in the 144 "requesting-user-name".

- 145 Figure 3.2 illustrates how the 'requesting-user-name' authentication method integrates into
- 146 an IPP operation request / response exchange. This is basically identical to the 'none' 147 method from a protocol perspective.



150 3.1.3. The 'basic' IPP Authentication Method

151 The 'basic' IPP Authentication Method uses HTTP Basic authentication scheme 152 [RFC7617]. It is employed in IPP in much the same way that it is employed in conventional HTTP workflows using a Web browser. When the IPP Client encounters an HTTP 401 153 154 Unauthorized response, it evaluates whether it supports the authentication method identified by the value of the "WWW-Authenticated" header in the response. In this case, if 155 156 it supports 'basic', it will present UI asking the User to provide username and password 157 credentials that may be used to authenticate with the HTTP Server providing access to the IPP Printer. If the HTTP Server successfully authenticates that set of credentials, then the 158 IPP operation request is passed on to the IPP Printer, which responds as usual. 159

Figure 3.3 illustrates how the 'basic' authentication method integrates into an IPP operation request / response exchange.






Figure 3.3: Sequence diagram for the 'basic' IPP Authentication Method

163 3.1.4. The 'digest' IPP Authentication Method

164 The 'digest' IPP Authentication method uses the HTTP Digest authentication scheme 165 [RFC7616]. It is employed in IPP in much the same way that it is employed in conventional HTTP workflows using a Web browser; when the IPP Client encounters an HTTP 401 166 167 Unauthorized response, it evaluates whether it supports the authentication method identified by the value of the "WWW-Authenticated" header in the response. In this case, if 168 it supports 'digest', it will present UI asking the User to provide username and password 169 170 credentials that may be used to authenticate with the HTTP Server providing access to the IPP Printer. If the HTTP Server successfully authenticates that set of credentials, then the 171 IPP operation request is passed on to the IPP Printer, which responds as usual. 172

173 Figure 3.4 illustrates how the 'digest' authentication method integrates into an IPP 174 operation request / response exchange.






Figure 3.4: Sequence diagram for the 'digest' IPP Authentication Method

176 **3.1.5. The 'negotiate' IPP Authentication Method**

177 The 'negotiate' IPP Authentication method uses the HTTP Negotiate authentication 178 scheme [RFC4559], which is used to support Kerberos and NTLM authentication methods 179 with HTTP.

180 Figure 3.5 illustrates how the 'negotiate' authentication method integrates into an IPP 181 operation request / response exchange.




Figure 3.5 : Sequence diagram for the 'negotiate' IPP Authentication Method

183 3.1.6. The 'oauth' IPP Authentication Method

184 The 'oauth' IPP Authentication method uses the OAuth2 authentication scheme [RFC6749]

185 [RFC6749] and the OAuth2 Bearer Token [RFC6750]. Figure 3.6 illustrates how the 'oauth'

186 authentication method integrates into an IPP operation request / response exchange.






Figure 3.6 : Sequence diagram for the 'oauth' IPP Authentication Method

188 **3.1.7. The 'certificate' IPP Authentication Method**

The 'certificate' IPP Authentication method uses X.509 certificate authentication via TLS. X.509 certificate authentication via TLS is initiated by the Printer by sending a Certificate Request message during the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] handshake. The Client then sends the X.509 certificate identifying the User and/or Client in a corresponding Certificate message, and a subsequent Certificate Verify message to prove to the Printer that the Client has the corresponding private key. If the Client has no configured X.509 certificate to provide, it sends an empty Certificate message.


The Printer SHOULD allow both empty and valid X.509 certificates. The Printer SHOULD return the IPP status code listed in Table 3.1 when the corresponding authentication exception occurs. The Client SHOULD respond to the reported status code with the corresponding response listed in Table 3.1.

200

Operation Status Code	Authentication Exception	Recommended Client Response
'client-error-not-authenticated'	Authentication required but no X.509 certificate supplied	Close the connection; select a certificate (with possible user interaction); retry connection with selected certificate
'client-error-not-authorized'	Access denied for the identity specified by the provided X.509 certificate; try again	Close the connection; select a different certificate (with possible user interaction); retry connection with selected certificate
'client-error-forbidden'	Access denied for the identity specified by the provided X.509 certificate; don't try again	Close the connection and present User with error dialog ("Access denied")

Table 3.1 : IPP 'certificate' Authentication Method Error Condition Status Codes

Figure 3.7 illustrates how the TLS authentication method integrates into an IPP operation request / response exchange.



203

Figure 3.7 : Sequence diagram for X.509 Certificate Authentication Via TLS

204 **4. Implementation Recommendations**

Provide possible technical solutions/approaches in this section. Include pros and cons for
 each technical solution or approach. Include references to specific protocols and/or data
 models when appropriate. Include mapping and gateway considerations when appropriate.

208 **4.1. Client Implementation Recommendations**

209 4.1.1. General Recommendations

A Client SHOULD limit the number of additional windows presented to the user during the course of an authentication workflow, to avoid causing a fragmented, disruptive user experience.

213 **4.1.2. Handling Authentication Failure**

If a Printer rejects authentication credentials provided by a Client in response to an authentication challenge following an IPP operation request, the Printer MAY return an IPP operation response. If it does not, and the connection is left open, it SHOULD treat the connection the same way it handles a stalled connection, and close it after a reasonably brief amount of time.

219 4.1.3. OAuth2 Recommendations

The OAuth2 authorization service may have a complicated user presentation. If possible, select a presentation alternative that is the least complicated or the most similar to the user experience provided for older authentication methods (HTTP Basic or HTTP Digest) that may be more familiar to the user.

4.2. Printer Implementation Recommendations

225 **4.2.1. Handling Authentication Failure**

If a Printer receives an IPP operation request, challenges the Client for authentication, and
 the authentication process fails, the Printer SHOULD send an appropriate IPP operation
 response indicating the cause of the failure.

229 4.2.2. OAuth2 Recommendations

To align with existing Client authentication user experience for HTTP Basic or HTTP Digest authentication, the OAuth2 Authentication Server SHOULD use HTTP Basic or HTTP Digest authentication rather than presenting an authentication dialog page using its own web content. If that isn't practical, an OAuth2 Authorization Service used in an IPP printing workflow SHOULD direct a Client to an authentication page that facilitates an appropriatepresentation on even limited Client systems such as smart phones.

5. Internationalization Considerations

For interoperability and basic support for multiple languages, conforming implementations MUST support the Universal Character Set (UCS) Transformation Format -- 8 bit (UTF-8) [RFC3629] encoding of Unicode [UNICODE] [ISO10646] and the Unicode Format for Network Interchange [RFC5198].

- 241 Implementations of this specification SHOULD conform to the following standards on 242 processing of human-readable Unicode text strings, see:
- Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm [UAX9] left-to-right, right-to-left, and vertical
- Unicode Line Breaking Algorithm [UAX14] character classes and wrapping
- Unicode Normalization Forms [UAX15] especially NFC for [RFC5198]
- Unicode Text Segmentation [UAX29] grapheme clusters, words, sentences
- Unicode Identifier and Pattern Syntax [UAX31] identifier use and normalization
- Unicode Collation Algorithm [UTS10] sorting
- Unicode Locale Data Markup Language [UTS35] locale databases
- Implementations of this specification are advised to also review the following informationaldocuments on processing of human-readable Unicode text strings:
- Unicode Character Encoding Model [UTR17] multi-layer character model
- Unicode in XML and other Markup Languages [UTR20] XML usage
- Unicode Character Property Model [UTR23] character properties
- Unicode Conformance Model [UTR33] Unicode conformance basis

256 6. Security Considerations

257 6.1. Human-readable Strings

258 Implementations of this specification SHOULD conform to the following standard on 259 processing of human-readable Unicode text strings, see:

• Unicode Security Mechanisms [UTS39] – detecting and avoiding security attacks

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- 261 Implementations of this specification are advised to also review the following informational262 document on processing of human-readable Unicode text strings:
- Unicode Security FAQ [UNISECFAQ] common Unicode security issues

264 **6.2. Client Security Considerations**

- 265 An IPP Client SHOULD follow these recommendations:
- A Client SHOULD securely store at rest any personally identifiable information (PII)
 and authentication credentials such as passwords.
- 268 2. A Client SHOULD only respond to an authentication challenge over a secure connection (TLS) [RFC8010][RFC8011] unless TLS is not supported over that transport (e.g. IPP USB).
- 3. A Client SHOULD validate the identity of the Printer by whatever means are available for that connection type. If the connection is secured via TLS [RFC8010], the Client SHOULD validate the server's TLS certificate, match it to the originating host, cross-check it to match the host name or IP address in the IPP URI for the target Printer, and otherwise follow industry best practices for validating the Printer's identity using X.509 certificates over TLS [RFC6125]. If the connection is not secured via TLS, other means may be necessary to validate the Printer's identity.
- 4. A Client SHOULD provide a means to allow the User to examine a Printer's provided identity.
- A Client SHOULD provide one or more means of notification when it is engaging
 with a previously encountered Printer whose identity has changed.
- 282 6. OAuth2 Considerations
- The recommendations in "Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients" [RFC7636] SHOULD be followed, since the threats described therein has been observed in practice.
- 286
 287
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 288
 289
 2. The recommendations in "OAuth 2 for Native Apps" [RFC8252] should be followed if the print system provides its own user interface presentation and controls for handling the OAuth2 authentication steps, to mitigate the risks described therein.

290 6.3. Printer Security Considerations

291 An IPP Printer:

- SHOULD securely store at rest any personally identifiable information (PII) and authentication credentials such as passwords that are local to the Printer.
- SHOULD only challenge a Client for authentication over a secure connection (TLS)
 [RFC8010][RFC8011] unless TLS is not supported over that transport (e.g. IPP USB).
- 297 3. SHOULD support User-provisioned X.509 certificates:
- 298 1. The certificate MUST persist across power cycles
- 299 2. The certificate MUST NOT be automatically renewed or replaced
- 3003. The certificate SHOULD have a maximum expiration of 3 year from the date of issuance
- 302 4. The certificate SHOULD NOT use MD5 or SHA-1 hashes
- 303 4. SHOULD support self-generated self-signed X.509 certificates:
- 304 1. The certificate persists across power cycles
- 3052. The certificate has a minimum default expiration of 5 years from the date of issuance / generation
- 307
 30. The certificate is automatically renewed (regenerated), using a new private key if
 308 the previous certificate has expired
- 309
 310
 4. The certificate is generated using the mDNS, DHCP and/or manually-configured DNS hostname(s) and regenerated whenever these change
- 5. The Printer MUST be able to generate RSA certificates with a key length of 2048
 bits using SHA-256 hash
- 3136. The Printer SHOULD be able to generate ECDSA certificates using the
secp256r1(P-256), secp384r1 (P-384), or secp521r1 (P-521) curves and a SHA-
256 hash.
- The Printer MUST NOT generate self-signed certificates using MD5 or SHA-1
 hashes

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438 9. Change History

439 **9.1. June 29, 2018**

- 440 Updated as per feedback from PWG May 2018 F2F:
- Added line numbers
- Resolved typos in diagrams in figures 3.5, 3.6, and the "new" 3.7 (TLS)
- Removed the second OAuth2 diagram

Rewrote the TLS client authentication scheme description (contributed by Mike
 Sweet) and re-titled the section for its corresponding "uri-authentication-supported"
 keyword ('certificate')

447 **9.2. May 10, 2018**

448 Updated figures 6 and 7 (relating to OAuth2) to add a note indicating where the Printer 449 might be able to acquire a user identifier suitable for making policy choices. Also made a 450 few minor editorial updates.

451 **9.3. April 30, 2018**

452 Changed to Apache OpenOffice template. Added Mike Sweet as a co-author since he has 453 contributed a great deal of content to the document. Resolved all "to-do" highlighted areas 454 and resolved issues identified in the February 2018 vF2F minutes (<u>https://ftp.pwg.org/pub/</u> 455 <u>pwg/ipp/minutes/ippv2-f2f-minutes-20180207.pdf</u>):

- Added sequence diagram for X.509 client authentication
- Added sequence diagram for hybrid 'oauth' / 'digest' authentication
- Many other changes

459 **9.4. January 23, 2018**

- 460 Updated as per email feedback and discussion:
- Fixed some editorial issues with naming HTTP Basic, HTTP Digest, and HTTP
 Negotiate, and some names of sections.
- Added mention of "printer-xri-supported".
- Added additional references.
- Added additional sub-sections to capture Client and Printer recommendations for appropriate behavior when authentication is unsuccessful since the negative cases can vary widely.

468 **9.5. December 5, 2017**

469 Updated as per feedback from the November 2017 PWG vF2F and subsequent work with470 IPP WG members on specific details:

 471 • Corrected OAuth2 sequence diagram to more correctly describe the sequence of 472 operations and actors involved in an OAuth2 authenticated IPP Printer scenario. 473 • Added Implementation Recommendations that were revealed during the course of correcting the OAuth2 sequence diagram.

475 **9.6. August 3, 2017**

476 Initial revision.