April 30, 2018 White Paper



The Printer Working Group

IPP Authentication Methods (IPPAUTH)

Status: Interim

Abstract: This document is a whitepaper that describes the interaction between IPP and various authentication mechanisms used byIPP's HTTP and HTTPS transports, and how they might affect the authentication user experience on systems running an IPP Client.

This document is a White Paper. For the definition of a "White Paper", see:

http://ftp.pwg.org/pub/pwg/general/pwg-process30.pdf

This document is available electronically at:

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1. Introduction

The Internet Printing Protocol (hereafter, IPP) uses HTTP as its underlying transport [RFC8010]. When an IPP Printer is configured to limit access to its services to only those Clients operated by an authorized User, it challenges the User's Client by employing one of the HTTP authentication methods. But an IPP Client isn't usually a typical HTTP User Agent (e.g. it isn't a commonly used Web browser). This white paper examines the common HTTP authentication methods employed today and outlines limits, constraints and conventions that ought to be considered when implementing support for one of these different HTTP authentication methods to ensure a high quality printing user experience.

2. Terminology

2.1. Protocol Roles Terminology

This document defines the following protocol roles in order to specify unambiguous conformance requirements:

Client: Initiator of outgoing IPP session requests and sender of outgoing IPP operation requests (Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230] User Agent).

Printer: Listener for incoming IPP session requests and receiver of incoming IPP operation requests (Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230] Server) that represents one or more Physical Devices or a Logical Device.

2.2. Other Terms Used in This Document

User. A person or automata using a Client to communicate with a Printer.

2.3. Acronyms and Organizations

IANA: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, http://www.iana.org/

IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force, http://www.ietf.org/

ISO: International Organization for Standardization, http://www.iso.org/

PWG: Printer Working Group, <u>http://www.pwg.org/</u>

3. Overview of IPP Authentication Methods

This white paper describes how various HTTP based authentication systems integrate into IPP communications between a Client and a Printer. Although the authentication protocols themselves do not need to change to be integrated into IPP communications, the IPP Client is not a Web browser, so some considerations must be made by IPP Client implementors. The "uri-authentication-supported" attribute [RFC8011] Printer Description attribute indicates the authentication systems supported by the Printer.

3.1. Client Authentication Methods

An IPP Printer specifies its supported authentication methods via several IPP attributes. The "uri-authentication-supported" attribute [RFC8011] indicates the authentication method used for a corresponding URI in "printer-uri-supported" [RFC8011]. The "xri-authentication" member attribute of "printer-xri-supported" [RFC3380] specifies the same corresponding values, if the Printer implements the "printer-xri-supported" attribute.

A Printer uses the "authenticated identity" or the "most authenticated user" [RFC8011] to allow access to capabilities such as operations, resources, and attributes. Authentication is the process of establishing some level of trust that an entity is who or what they are claiming to be.

Each of the authentication method keywords currently registered for "uri-authenticationsupported" is described below, with an accompanying sequence diagram for illustration purposes, as well as a discussion of each method's advantages and shortcomings.

3.1.1. The 'none' IPP Authentication Method

The 'none' IPP Authentication Method [RFC8011] very simply indicates that the receiving Printer is provided no method whatsoever to determine the identity of the User who is operating the Client that is making IPP operation requests. The user name for the operation is assumed to be 'anonymous'.




Figure 1: Sequence diagram for the 'none' IPP Authentication Method

This method is not recommended unless the Printer's operator has the objective of providing an anonymous print service. In most cases, the Client SHOULD provide the "requesting-user-name" operation attribute, as described in section 3.1.2.

3.1.2. The 'requesting-user-name' IPP Authentication Method

In the 'requesting-user-name' IPP Authentication Method [RFC8011], the Client MUST provides the "requesting-user-name" operation attribute [RFC8011] in its IPP operation request. The Printer uses this unauthenticated name as the identity of the actor operating the Client.




Figure 2: Sequence diagram for the 'requesting-user-name' IPP Authentication Method

This method is not recommended since there is no actual authentication performed as there is no credential provided to prove the identity claimed in the "requesting-user-name".

3.1.3. The 'basic' IPP Authentication Method

The 'basic' IPP Authentication Method uses HTTP Basic authentication scheme [RFC7617]. It is employed in IPP in much the same way that it is employed in conventional HTTP workflows using a Web browser. When the IPP Client encounters an HTTP 401 Unauthorized response, it evaluates whether it supports the authentication method identified by the value of the "WWW-Authenticated" header in the response. In this case, if it supports 'basic', it will present UI asking the User to provide username and password credentials that may be used to authenticate with the HTTP Server providing access to the IPP Printer. If the HTTP Server successfully authenticates that set of credentials, then the IPP operation request is passed on to the IPP Printer, which responds as usual.




Figure 3: Sequence diagram for the 'basic' IPP Authentication Method

3.1.4. The 'digest' IPP Authentication Method

The 'digest' IPP Authentication method uses the HTTP Digest authentication scheme [RFC7616]. It is employed in IPP in much the same way that it is employed in conventional HTTP workflows using a Web browser; when the IPP Client encounters an HTTP 401 Unauthorized response, it evaluates whether it supports the authentication method identified by the value of the "WWW-Authenticated" header in the response. In this case, if it supports 'digest', it will present UI asking the User to provide username and password credentials that may be used to authenticate with the HTTP Server providing access to the IPP Printer. If the HTTP Server successfully authenticates that set of credentials, then the IPP operation request is passed on to the IPP Printer, which responds as usual.




Figure 4: Sequence diagram for the 'digest' IPP Authentication Method

3.1.5. The 'negotiate' IPP Authentication Method

The 'negotiate' IPP Authentication method uses the HTTP Negotiate authentication scheme [RFC4559].




Figure 5: Sequence diagram for the 'negotiate' IPP Authentication Method

3.1.6. The 'oauth' IPP Authentication Method

The 'oauth' IPP Authentication method uses the OAuth2 authentication scheme [RFC6749] [RFC6749] and the OAuth2 Bearer Token [RFC6750]. A conventional OAuth2 authentication workflow integrated into an IPP Print flow is described in Error: Reference source not found.




Figure 6: Sequence diagram for the 'oauth' IPP Authentication Method

In the OAuth2 process, the user experience for servicing the authentication challenge is commonly provided by "web content" (HTML etc.) presented in a "web view" (embeddable web browser). Since this can be awkward or disorienting in a print workflow, a hybrid of 'oauth' and 'basic' or 'digest' can be employed, as outlined in Figure 7.




Figure 7: Sequence diagram for the hybrid 'oauth' / 'digest' IPP Authentication Method

3.1.7. X.509 Certificate Authentication Via TLS

Client X.509 certificate authentication in an HTTP session is achieved using the client authentication facilities of Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246], the commonly used protocol for encrypting an HTTP or IPP connection [RFC8010][RFC8011]. In this




Figure 8: Sequence diagram for X.509 Certificate Authentication Via TLS

4. Implementation Recommendations

Provide possible technical solutions/approaches in this section. Include pros and cons for each technical solution or approach. Include references to specific protocols and/or data models when appropriate. Include mapping and gateway considerations when appropriate.

4.1. Client Implementation Recommendations

4.1.1. General Recommendations

A Client SHOULD limit the number of additional windows presented to the user during the course of an authentication workflow, to avoid causing a fragmented, disruptive user experience.

4.1.2. Handling Authentication Failure

If a Printer rejects authentication credentials provided by a Client in response to an authentication challenge following an IPP operation request, the Printer MAY return an IPP operation response. If it does not, and the connection is left open, it SHOULD treat the connection the same way it handles a stalled connection, and close it after a reasonably brief amount of time.

4.1.3. OAuth2 Recommendations

The OAuth2 authorization service may have a complicated user presentation. If possible, select a presentation alternative that is the least complicated or the most similar to the user experience provided for older authentication methods (HTTP Basic or HTTP Digest) that may be more familiar to the user.

4.2. Printer Implementation Recommendations

4.2.1. Handling Authentication Failure

If a Printer receives an IPP operation request, challenges the Client for authentication, and the authentication process fails, the Printer SHOULD send an appropriate IPP operation response indicating the cause of the failure.

4.2.2. OAuth2 Recommendations

To align with existing Client authentication user experience for HTTP Basic or HTTP Digest authentication, the OAuth2 Authentication Server SHOULD use HTTP Basic or HTTP Digest authentication rather than presenting an authentication dialog page using its own web content. If that isn't practical, an OAuth2 Authorization Service used in an IPP

printing workflow SHOULD direct a Client to an authentication page that facilitates an appropriate presentation on even limited Client systems such as smart phones.

5. Internationalization Considerations

For interoperability and basic support for multiple languages, conforming implementations MUST support the Universal Character Set (UCS) Transformation Format -- 8 bit (UTF-8) [RFC3629] encoding of Unicode [UNICODE] [ISO10646] and the Unicode Format for Network Interchange [RFC5198].

Implementations of this specification SHOULD conform to the following standards on processing of human-readable Unicode text strings, see:

- Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm [UAX9] left-to-right, right-to-left, and vertical
- Unicode Line Breaking Algorithm [UAX14] character classes and wrapping
- Unicode Normalization Forms [UAX15] especially NFC for [RFC5198]
- Unicode Text Segmentation [UAX29] grapheme clusters, words, sentences
- Unicode Identifier and Pattern Syntax [UAX31] identifier use and normalization
- Unicode Collation Algorithm [UTS10] sorting
- Unicode Locale Data Markup Language [UTS35] locale databases

Implementations of this specification are advised to also review the following informational documents on processing of human-readable Unicode text strings:

- Unicode Character Encoding Model [UTR17] multi-layer character model
- Unicode in XML and other Markup Languages [UTR20] XML usage
- Unicode Character Property Model [UTR23] character properties
- Unicode Conformance Model [UTR33] Unicode conformance basis

6. Security Considerations

6.1. Human-readable Strings

Implementations of this specification SHOULD conform to the following standard on processing of human-readable Unicode text strings, see:

• Unicode Security Mechanisms [UTS39] – detecting and avoiding security attacks

Implementations of this specification are advised to also review the following informational document on processing of human-readable Unicode text strings:

• Unicode Security FAQ [UNISECFAQ] – common Unicode security issues

6.2. Client Security Considerations

An IPP Client SHOULD follow these recommendations:

- 1. A Client SHOULD securely store at rest any personally identifiable information (PII) and authentication credentials such as passwords.
- 2. A Client SHOULD only respond to an authentication challenge over a secure connection (TLS) [RFC8010][RFC8011] unless TLS is not supported over that transport (e.g. IPP USB).
- 3. A Client SHOULD validate the identity of the Printer by whatever means are available for that connection type. If the connection is secured via TLS [RFC8010], the Client SHOULD validate the server's TLS certificate, match it to the originating host, and cross-check it to match the host name or IP address in the IPP URI for the target Printer. If the connection is not secured via TLS, other means may be needed.
- 4. A Client SHOULD provide a means to allow the User to examine a Printer's provided identity.
- 5. A Client SHOULD provide one or more means of notification when it is engaging with a previously encountered Printer whose identity has changed.
- 6. OAuth2 Considerations
 - 1. The recommendations in "Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients" [RFC7636] SHOULD be followed, since the threats described therein has been observed in practice.
 - 2. The recommendations in "OAuth 2 for Native Apps" [RFC8252] should be followed if the print system provides its own user interface presentation and controls for handling the OAuth2 authentication steps, to mitigate the risks described therein.

6.3. Printer Security Considerations

An IPP Printer:

- 1. SHOULD securely store at rest any personally identifiable information (PII) and authentication credentials such as passwords that are local to the Printer.
- SHOULD only challenge a Client for authentication over a secure connection (TLS) [RFC8010][RFC8011] unless TLS is not supported over that transport (e.g. IPP USB).
- 3. SHOULD support User-provisioned X.509 certificates:
 - 1. The certificate persists across power cycles
 - 2. The certificate MUST NOT be automatically renewed or replaced
 - 3. The certificate has a maximum expiration of 1 year from the date of issuance
- 4. SHOULD support self-generated self-signed X.509 certificates:
 - 1. The certificate persists across power cycles
 - 2. The certificate has a minimum default expiration of 5 years from the date of issuance / generation
 - 3. The certificate is automatically renewed (regenerated), using a new private key if the previous certificate has expired
 - 4. The certificate is generated using the mDNS, DHCP and/or manually-configured DNS hostname(s) and regenerated whenever these change
 - 5. The Printer MUST be able to generate RSA certificates with a key length of 2048 bits using SHA-256 hash
 - 6. The Printer SHOULD be able to generate ECDSA certificates using the secp256r1(P-256), secp384r1 (P-384), or secp521r1 (P-521) curves and a SHA-256 hash.
 - 7. The Printer MUST NOT generate self-signed certificates using a SHA-1 hash

7. References

7.1. Normative References

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[UAX29]	Unicode Consortium, "Unicode Text Segmentation", UAX#29, June 2016, http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr29
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[UTS35]	Unicode Consortium, "Unicode Locale Data Markup Language", UTS#35, October 2016, <u>http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr35</u>
[UTS39]	Unicode Consortium, "Unicode Security Mechanisms", UTS#39, June 2016, <u>http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39</u>

7.2. Informative References

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9. Change History

9.1. April 30, 2018

Changed to Apache OpenOffice template. Added Mike Sweet as a co-author since he has contributed a great deal of content to the document. Resolved all "to-do" highlighted areas and resolved issues identified in the February 2018 vF2F minutes (https://ftp.pwg.org/pub/pwg/ipp/minutes/ippv2-f2f-minutes-20180207.pdf):

- Added sequence diagram for X.509 client authentication
- Added sequence diagram for hybrid 'oauth' / 'digest' authentication
- Many other changes

9.2. January 23, 2018

Updated as per email feedback and discussion:

- Fixed some editorial issues with naming HTTP Basic, HTTP Digest, and HTTP Negotiate, and some names of sections.
- Added mention of "printer-xri-supported".
- Added additional references.
- Added additional sub-sections to capture Client and Printer recommendations for appropriate behavior when authentication is unsuccessful since the negative cases can vary widely.

9.3. December 5, 2017

Updated as per feedback from the November 2017 PWG vF2F and subsequent work with IPP WG members on specific details:

- Corrected OAuth2 sequence diagram to more correctly describe the sequence of operations and actors involved in an OAuth2 authenticated IPP Printer scenario.
- Added Implementation Recommendations that were revealed during the course of correcting the OAuth2 sequence diagram.

April 30, 2018

9.4. August 3, 2017

Initial revision.